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Abstract
We analyze the pace and patterns of job reallocation in Ukraine using 1992-2000 panel data
on nearly the surviving universe of manufacturing firms inherited from the Soviet Union.
Employment growth displays substantial increase in heterogeneity during this transition
period, with a corresponding rise in excess job reallocation. Unlike data for Soviet Russia in
the 1980s, Ukrainian job reallocation in the 1990s was clearly productivity-enhancing, both
within and across industries. The paper also estimates the effects of firm and market
characteristics on the magnitude of reallocation and on the extent to which it has contributed
to aggregate productivity growth.
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1. Introduction
Although much has been written about the important role played by labor reallocation
in the transition of the post-socialist economies, there are relatively few analytical studies of
the degree to which labor markets have been successful in facilitating the movement of
workers from less productive to more productive activities. This lack of analysis may partly
be due to the fact that the attention of economists studying labor markets in transition has
tended to be dominated by a two-sector model in which labor gradually shifts from stateowned to privately owned firms and in which within-sector homogeneity is assumed.1
Essentially, a representative state-owned (industrial) enterprise destroys jobs and a
representative privately owned (service sector) firm creates them.
While a reasonable simplification for some purposes, this representative firm model
omits much of the interesting heterogeneity within sectors. Moreover, on closer examination,
actual labor flows appear to be largely inconsistent with it, as turnover of jobs and workers is
much larger than required merely for flows from state to private ownership or from
manufacturing to service industries—although these flows are nontrivial.

More

disaggregated studies, using microdata, have documented substantial labor mobility within
these sectors.2 Furthermore, it has become plain that broad sectors mask substantial variation
in firm performance, restructuring, and productivity. If the labor market is supposed to be
functioning to reallocate labor from less to more productive uses, then the focus on aggregate
sectors may be somewhat misplaced.

1

This view is characteristic of the so-called “optimal speed of transition” literature. See, for instance,
Aghion and Blanchard (1994).
2
See, e.g., Boeri (2000). Studies of worker flows in transition economies include Brown and Earle (2003),
Earle (1997), Earle and Sabirianova (2001), Kapeliushnikov (1997), Layard and Richter (1995), Lehmann
and Wadsworth (2000), Munich, Terrell, and Svejnar (2002), and Sabirianova (2002). Studies of job flows
include Acquisti and Lehmann (2000), Bilsen and Konings (1998), Brown and Earle (2002, 2004), Faggio
and Konings (1999), Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002), Jurajda and Terrell (2001), and Konings,
Lehmann and Schaffer (1996).
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In this paper, we argue that an evaluation of the extent to which labor markets in
transition economies have begun to successfully perform this function requires detailed
microdata at the firm level and a methodology for connecting labor flows with productivity
performance. Drawing upon measurement methods introduced by Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992, 1999), we describe the magnitudes and patterns of job reallocation in Ukraine, and the
relationship of the observed job flows with a measure of firm productivity. Our focus on job
rather than worker flows is dictated by limitations of our data, but it is also more
straightforward to relate firm-level productivity with firm-level employment, rather than with
worker mobility. Our purpose in examining Ukraine is to extend our recent analysis of
Russia (Brown and Earle, 2002) to a large transition country, albeit one that has been
somewhat neglected by transition research. While the starting point of the transition process
was quite similar in both cases, given the common Soviet heritage, the choice of policies
thereafter was quite different, with Ukraine by most accounts following a more “gradualist”
path of slower liberalization, privatization, and stabilization than its larger neighbor. Is the
gradualist policy reflected in a slower or faster pace of job reallocation and a better or worse
functioning of the labor market, in the sense of the correlation of job flows with productivity?
Are the patterns of job flows becoming more similar to those observed in the West (for
instance, as reported by Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992 and 1999), and how do those patterns
compare with those in Russia? These are the main questions around which we organize our
analysis.
The paper’s focus is restricted to firms operating in the manufacturing sector. Again,
this focus is dictated by constraints of available data, but the size of this sector, its importance
to the Ukrainian economy in the Soviet period, and the particular difficulties of restructuring
suggest that it is also a worthwhile subject for study. The data we employ do have the
advantages of a fairly long time series—annual from 1992 to 2000—and they are quite
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comparable in scope and variable definitions to those in our Russia study.3 We should
emphasize, however, that the data permit no inferences to be drawn concerning entry, exit,
and the new private firm sector, which is likely to be an important source of growing labor
demand and job creation.4
In Ukraine as in Russia, it is clear even from aggregate statistics that job destruction
has dominated job creation in the industrial sector.

Figure 1 shows the evolution of

employment over the 1992–2000 period, including a remarkable fall of nearly 40 percent by
1999, followed by a small increase in 2000.5

Although large by any standard, the

employment drop was nonetheless substantially exceeded by the fall in output to less than 50
percent of its initial level.
These patterns may be unsurprising to anyone familiar with recent developments in
the East European region, but little is known about the character of this massive job
destruction in the industrial sector. Does it represent a process of creative destruction,
whereby the least efficient firms downsize and eventually disappear, while the more efficient
grow? Or does it represent severe recession, in firms have been hit by a common negative
shock? A final possibility is that the job destruction is concentrated among the better, more
efficient firms in industry, suggesting “sclerosis” in the sense of Caballero and Hammour
(2000), whereby unproductive firms survive due to market imperfections and government
policies. In Ukraine, as in Russia, there may be particularly compelling reasons to suspect

3

The comparison to our research on Russia is also useful because in that study (Brown and Earle, 2002)
we were able to analyze annual data back to 1985 and thus could trace out longer term changes from the
pre-perestroika Soviet period into the transition. Given that Ukraine was governed by the same economic
and political regime as Russia, the 1985–91 behavior for Ukraine is unlikely to differ substantially from
Russia, although unfortunately the earlier Ukrainian data are not available for analysis.
4
The Ukrainian Statistical Office (Derzhkomstat) industrial registry that we employ contains 94.1 and 85.2
percent of total industrial employment in 1992 and 2000, respectively. We do not know the precise criteria
for inclusion in the registry, but judging by the low number of entrants, we suspect that it does not include
new firms below a certain size. Analysis of entry and exit would require great efforts to establish missing
longitudinal links in the data; we are presently carrying out this research, but in this paper are able to report
job flows for continuing firms only.
5
These figures refer to annual average levels of employment, as do the variables in the enterprise data set
available to us.
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Figure 1
Production, Employment, and Productivity in Ukrainian Industry, 1992—2000
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some sclerotic forces at work, as the government may have directly subsidized or otherwise
supported weak and failing firms while taxes, bureaucratic interference, and poor contract
enforcement and property rights protection may have retarded the growth of firms that are
more successful. The view that the economic transition has destroyed the better, more
productive parts of the industrial sector is far from uncommon in Ukraine and other transition
economies, although it is usually associated with nostalgia for the Soviet period. In this
paper, we provide evidence on the character of resource reallocation by relating job flows to
firm-level productivity measures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a basic description
of the magnitudes, heterogeneity, and covariates of job flows, including their relationships
with ownership, market concentration, exports, capital intensity, wages, labor productivity,
and employment size. Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), our method is to estimate
the impact of these factors on employment growth and job reallocation in a regression
framework, and we then compute the partial coefficients measuring their effects on excess
job reallocation using simulation methods. To assess whether the job flow patterns have
changed over our observation period of 1992–2000—that is, whether they are moving in the
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direction of patterns characteristic of market economies—we interact the covariates with a
time trend in these regressions and simulations.

Section 3 relates the job flows to

productivity differentials across firms and industries. We employ decomposition techniques
drawn from Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) to
measure the contribution of job flows to sectoral and aggregate productivity growth, and we
also apply regression techniques to assess the statistical significance of the employment share
growth-productivity differential relationship and to estimate the effects of firm characteristics
on this relationship. We are particularly interested in assessing whether we can find evidence
for any effects of privatization and liberalization policies on this aspect of restructuring.
Section 4 provides a brief conclusion. The data sources and variable definitions are described
in an appendix.

2. Job Flows in Ukraine
We begin by reporting our calculations of job flows, following the definitions of
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999), except for the fact that—as noted above—we focus on
continuing firms and omit flows associated with firm entry and exit. As shown in Table 1,
net employment growth is negative every year from 1992 to 2000, with the largest declines in
the mid-1990s and the smallest in 1999–2000, the only year of substantial growth in
industrial production since the breakup of the Soviet Union.6

The creation rate was

negligible at the beginning of the 1990s, but it had risen substantially by the final year of the
decade.

The destruction rate is less trended, following the inverse U-shape of net

employment change, with the highest rates in the 1993–1997 period and falling off slightly in

6

The official statistics on aggregate industrial employment (in Figure 1) imply employment growth from
1999 to 2000, but these include estimates of employment in new small firms and incorporate other expert
opinions of the State Statistical Committee.
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the later years. Job reallocation is fairly constant at about 12 percent after the first year,
while excess job reallocation rises steadily and gradually.
In broad terms, this pattern is fairly similar to that of Russia, as we described in
Brown and Earle (2002). The numbers for the first year of the Ukrainian data are very
Table 1
Year-by-Year Job Flow Rates

1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
Average

Creation
DestructRate
ion Rate
(All Firms) (All Firms)
1.1
8.3
1.2
11.6
1.3
11.1
1.6
11.2
1.6
11.2
1.7
10.0
2.4
10.1
3.4
8.6
1.8
10.3

Reallocation Rate
9.4
12.7
12.4
12.7
12.8
11.7
12.5
12.0
12.0

Net
Change
-7.2
-10.4
-9.8
-9.6
-9.7
-8.3
-7.7
-5.2
-8.5

Excess
Reallocation
2.1
2.3
2.6
3.1
3.2
3.4
4.9
6.8
3.6

Number
of Firms
6,759
7,410
7,449
7,574
7,781
6,946
7,866
6,530
7,289

Source: Authors’ calculations.

similar to the corresponding figures for Russia in the same year. But the subsequent rises in
the job creation rate and particularly in the destruction rate are more abrupt in Russia, for
instance reaching a 14.5 percent destruction rate in 1993–94 and a 3.3 percent creation rate
by 1995–96. The excess job reallocation rate in Russia was already 6.5 percent in 1995–96,
more than double the Ukrainian rate that year. The data, therefore, do appear to be fairly
consistent with the usual picture of a more rapidly reforming Russia—which adopted a
“shock therapy” program of liberalization and stabilization in January 1992 and one of the
most rapid privatization programs the world has ever seen from late 1992 to 1994—while
Ukraine moved more slowly. Even if the Russian program contained many missteps, or even
steps backwards, the data suggest that the policies may indeed have had consequences for
restructuring.
Table 2 documents the persistence of the job flows, i.e., the extent to which jobs
added or subtracted from the firm remain gained or lost in future years. They are highly
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persistent, especially destruction. Persistence is slightly higher than in Russia and also higher
than in the U.S. So most job flows in Ukraine are not temporary phenomena.
Table 2
Job Flow Persistence Rates
(1992-99 average)
1-Year
Persistence

2-Year
Persistence

Creation

70.0

45.7

Destruction

96.0

92.2

Reallocation

92.8

86.7

*The 2-year creation persistence in the second period is
the 1992–98 average.

Heterogeneity of employment growth rates across firms is a distinctive feature of a
market economy. Table 3 shows that growth rates became more heterogeneous each year
through 1999. Though employment declines in over half the firms each year, an increasing
proportion enjoy employment gains. Compared to Russia, Ukrainian employment change
was initially more homogeneous, and the standard deviation does not surpass Russia’s 1993–
94 level of heterogeneity until 1997–98.

The 1998–99 standard deviation for the two

countries is virtually identical, however. In sum, by this measure Ukraine moved in the
direction of a market economy at a slower rate than Russia, but it caught up by 1998-99.
Table 3
Distribution of Year-by-Year Employment Growth Rates (by %)

1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
1992-00

5
-27.0
-33.3
-33.8
-38.9
-40.5
-39.7
-52.9
-54.0
-40.0

10
-20.5
-25.3
-25.9
-28.2
-28.6
-28.1
-33.4
-34.5
-28.1

25
-12.1
-15.8
-15.2
-16.5
-16.3
-14.9
-16.9
-16.8
-15.6

50
-5.2
-7.4
-6.4
-7.1
-8.0
-6.2
-6.5
-5.4
-6.5

8

75
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.2
0.2
1.2
3.2
0.6

90
5.4
4.5
6.4
6.1
6.3
8.9
12.7
13.5
8.0

95
10.5
9.4
11.4
11.5
13.8
19.9
27.7
23.6
16.0

Mean
-6.5
-8.7
-8.0
-9.4
-9.6
-7.5
-8.5
-8.7
-8.4

SD
14.2
16.3
16.8
19.9
21.6
24.0
29.5
26.2
21.1

Job flow rates vary considerably across sectors, as shown in Table 4. The average job
creation rate is actually higher than the destruction rate in the electricity sector, while
machine building’s destruction rate is 11.5 times larger than the creation rate. The patterns
are very similar to those in Russia.
Table 4
Average Annual Job Flows by Sector, 1992–2000

All Industry
Electricity
Fuel
Ferrous Metallurgy
Non-Ferrous Metallurgy
Chemicals
Machine-Building
Forestry
Construction Materials
Light
Food Processing

Creation
2.0
3.8
2.3
2.4
3.4
1.3
1.1
2.1
1.5
1.5
3.1

Destruction
9.4
2.2
7.2
3.2
6.1
9.2
12.7
11.0
10.0
12.4
6.3

Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996)
describe the variation in job flows in the U.S. by a number of employer characteristics,
including size, capital intensity, export orientation, average wage, and labor productivity,
among others. In this section, we conduct a similar analysis, adding to this list of variables
ownership (state versus nonstate) and product and labor market concentration. These latter
factors are particularly interesting in the transition setting, as they represent the outcomes of
policies of privatization and liberalization; thus, we are interested in how those policies have
affected job flows.
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), and in order to present the results more
compactly, examine the robustness of the relationships when controlling for other factors, and
assess the statistical significance of our findings, we report regressions where firm growth
and absolute value of growth (reallocation) are dependent variables and these characteristics
are included as independent variables; the impact of reforms is assessed by including
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interaction terms with a time trend. We calculate excess job reallocation coefficients from
simulations of the impact of a one standard deviation change around the mean in each
continuous independent variable (or a change from 0 to 1 in the case of a dummy) on the
predicted excess reallocation rate, where all other variables are permitted to take their true
values (unlike Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999), who condition on the median values of all other
variables).

The excess reallocation simulations with the time trend interactions are

conditioned on Time=7 (1999–2000) and the main effects having the same values as in the
interaction term.
Taking the example of ownership, we estimate predicted excess reallocation for
nonstate ownership using equation (1), where êiNS is predicted excess reallocation for
nonstate firms, r̂iNS is predicted reallocation,
nonstate ownership,

βj

α

is a constant,

β NS

is the coefficient for

is a vector of coefficients on the other independent variables, X i is

a matrix of firm i’s true values for the other independent variables, and ĝ iNS is predicted
employment growth.

eˆiNS = rˆiNS (α + β NS + β j X i ) − abs (gˆ iNS (α + β NS + β j X i )) .

(1)

Then we estimate predicted excess reallocation for state ownership using equation (2).

eˆ iS = rˆiS (α + β j X i ) − abs (gˆ iS (α + β j X i )).

β NS

The only difference from equation (1) is that

(2)

drops out. The excess reallocation

coefficient is the mean of the predicted excess reallocation across all N firms, shown in
equation (3):
N

∂e
∂ NS

=

∑ (eˆ
i =1

iNS

− eˆ iS

)

N

measuring the marginal effect of nonstate ownership on excess job reallocation.
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(3)

We also control for fixed industry-territory effects. Given that, again following Davis
and Haltiwanger (1999), the firm characteristics are held constant over the entire period, the
coefficients on these variables represent their impacts on job flows at the beginning of the
reform period, while the coefficient on the interaction terms of characteristics with the time
dummy then measures the additional impact post-reform. Table 5 contains the results from
estimating these equations, as well as the calculations of excess job reallocation coefficients.
We start by examining firm size. A key finding in Western studies (Davis and
Haltiwanger, 1992) is that size is negatively associated with all types of job flows. In the

Table 5
Job Flow Regressions

Nonstate
Product Market Concentration
Export
Labor Market Concentration
Average Capital Intensity
Average Wage
Average Labor Productivity
Average Employment
Nonstate*Time
Product Mkt.
Concentration*Time
Export*Time
Labor Mkt.
Concentration*Time
Average Capital Intensity*Time
Average Wage*Time
Average Labor
Productivity*Time
Average Employment*Time
Time
Constant
Adjusted R2
N

Employment
Growth
-0.008 (-0.67)
0.015 (0.64)
-0.041 (-4.68)
0.062 (2.17)
-0.097 (-5.70)
0.006 (0.26)
0.128 (4.58)
0.001 (0.32)
0.001 (0.29)
-0.008 (-1.52)

Reallocation
-0.022 (-1.27)
0.026 (0.88)
0.035 (1.96)
-0.041 (-1.29)
0.076 (4.18)
0.001 (0.04)
-0.114 (-3.22)
-0.003 (-0.36)
0.001 (0.29)
-0.002 (-0.32)

Excess
Reallocation
-0.029
0.003
-0.003
0.002
-0.004
0.002
0.007
-0.002
0.016
-0.011

0.023 (8.29)
-0.004 (-0.47)

-0.021 (-3.92)
-0.003 (-0.33)

-0.081
-0.005

-0.005 (-1.14)
0.008 (1.24)
-0.000 (-0.00)

0.004 (0.96)
-0.006 (-0.85)
-0.008 (-1.03)

-0.000
0.003
-0.014

-0.001 (-1.28)
-0.014 (-2.13)
-0.072 (-2.76)
0.119
39,379

0.002 (1.05)
0.017 (2.85)
0.176 (13.21)
0.163
39,379

0.013
0.032

Note: t statistics are in parentheses, using standard errors corrected for clustering on firm identifier.
The regressions are weighted by employment, and they include fixed industry-territory effects. The
dependent variable in the reallocation regression is the absolute value of employment growth. Time is
a time trend ranging from 0 in 1993 to 7 in 2000.
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transition context, large firms emerging from the central planning system may be more likely
to require downsizing, but they also face higher political opposition to reducing employment,
so the expected relationship between job destruction and size is ambiguous. The employment
growth regressions show no statistically significant relationship between size and
employment growth and reallocation. Excess reallocation is higher in small firms, as in the
U.S., but surprisingly this difference narrowed over time. This contrasts with Russia, which
shows relationships more like the U.S.—higher flows of all types among small firms.
The ownership dimension is particularly interesting in transition economies, as it
represents the outcome, to a considerable extent, of explicit privatization policies intended to
facilitate enterprise restructuring through improved corporate governance. In Ukraine the
privatization process spread throughout the 1990s, in contrast to Russia, where three-quarters
of industrial firms were privatized by July 1994. Unfortunately, our data do not contain the
privatization date, so all firms privatized by 1998 are considered to be nonstate during the
entire period. Almost none of the firms were privatized by 1993, so the coefficient on
nonstate captures the pre-privatization relationship with job flows for those firms that later
became privatized. This allows us to detect selection bias in the nature of ownership change.
We find no statistically significant difference in employment growth or reallocation
between state and nonstate firms either preceding or following privatization.

Excess

reallocation, though, is estimated to have been lower for firms to be privatized prior to
privatization, but higher after privatization relative to firms that remain state owned. This is
consistent with privatization leading to greater restructuring.
Competition could also pressure firms to restructure, in which case one would expect
to see a greater increase in job creation and destruction among firms facing more competition
once markets are liberalized.

To investigate this issue, we employ three measures of

exposure to competition, including domestic product market concentration, exporting, and
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labor market concentration.

Starting with domestic product market concentration, our

measure follows Brown and Earle (2002) in order to take into account different geographic
market sizes across industries. We use data at two geographic levels: national and regional.
Our argument is that the geographic scope of the market in an industry is reflected in the
degree to which producers in the industry are located across different regions of the country.
For instance, an industry with member firms in all regions is likely to be characterized by
regional markets, and an industry with firms in only a few regions is likely to be a national
market. To implement a mixed concentration measure, we calculated the HHI in 1992 for
each industry at each geographic level (RegConcij for the regional HHI of firm i in 5-digit
industry j and NatConcij for the national HHI) and combined them into a single index as
follows:
Concij = RegPropj*RegConcij + (1 – RegPropj)*NatConcij,

(4)

where RegPropj refers to the proportion of regions with at least one firm in industry j. We
employ dummies for exporters in 1998, 1999, or 2000, the only years for which we have
export information. Finally, we calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 1993 industrial
employment concentration in each county (raion).
The regressions show no differences for employment growth or reallocation in
relation to product market concentration.

Excess reallocation was initially higher in

concentrated product markets, but the relationship reverses over time. So perhaps domestic
product market competition developed and began to have an effect as reforms were
implemented.
Exporting shows a strong association with job flows.

Exporting was initially

associated with less growth and more reallocation, but this reverses during the period.
Exporters thus seem to have downsized earlier than other firms. Exporting was associated
with less excess reallocation, especially in later years.
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Firms in less concentrated labor markets appear to have downsized more than others,
as shown by the positive coefficient for labor concentration in the employment growth
regression. Labor concentration was initially associated with greater excess reallocation, but
this reverses over time, as would be expected with liberalization.
Firms with greater fixed costs of labor turnover, for instance due to higher hiring costs
or more firm-specific human capital, should have a stronger incentive to hoard labor and may
exhibit lower rates of job creation and destruction. This proposition has been the motivation
for studies of job flows to examine their relationship with several firm characteristics that
may be associated with turnover costs, namely capital intensity, average wages (in the postreform period), and average labor productivity. A second motivation for examining capital
intensity in the Ukrainian context is that investment levels have been extremely low during
the transition due to the poor investment climate. Thus, capital-intensive firms may have
been forced to downsize more than others because of a greater need for investment to
continue operating.
Capital intensity is associated with less growth and more reallocation, consistent with
the poor investment climate hypothesis. Excess reallocation is lower in capital-intensive
firms, which together with the employment growth results suggests that few capital-intensive
firms are creating jobs. Wages are increasingly associated with excess reallocation, contrary
to the firm-specific human capital hypothesis. As in Russia, we suspect that the increase
reflects the abrupt demand shifts and large labor mobility costs: firms creating jobs are
forced to pay higher wages to attract workers.
Labor productivity is positively associated with growth and negatively associated with
reallocation, as in Russia.

This is a first indication of a positive association between

reallocation and productivity growth. Labor productivity is initially positively associated
with excess reallocation, but then it becomes negative. So the results relating to the firm-
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specific human capital hypothesis are quite mixed, as we found in Russia. The positive
association between labor productivity and growth suggests a relationship between
reallocation and productivity growth, which we will examine further in the next section.

3. Job Reallocation and Productivity Growth
The discussion so far has documented the magnitude, covariates, and changes in job
flows during the course of reforms. But how do job flows, particularly the increased pace of
job destruction in the old manufacturing sector, relate to productivity? Has the downsizing
process been creative, in the sense of contributing to productivity growth by eliminating less
productive jobs? Or would it better be characterized as neutral with respect to productivity,
or even as destructive, resulting in the elimination of the more productive jobs in the
Ukrainian economy? Has the implied productivity impact of job reallocation changed as
reforms have been implemented? Does the productivity relationship vary with observable
characteristics of firms, including measures of ownership, market competition, capital
intensity and wage level, and how have these patterns changed?
This section addresses these questions by building on decomposition methods
proposed by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) and others. Our extensions are twofold.
First, our decompositions include both an intermediate decomposition of industry
productivity into its components and an aggregation of the cross-industry relationships to
total manufacturing sector productivity. By contrast, Foster et al. report only the crossindustry averages of the within-industry relationship of employment growth and productivity.
An argument against our extension of the analysis to aggregate productivity is that
measurement constraints, chiefly the availability of only gross output rather than value-added
in the data and the absence of disaggregated deflators, create problems in interpreting the
cross-industry job flows-productivity relationship. We believe that the considerable interest
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in accounting for aggregate productivity dynamics outweighs these problems, but they should
be borne in mind when interpreting the results below.
Our second methodological extension moves beyond the simple decompositions to
investigate the statistical significance of the relationships implied by the decomposition terms
(for instance, the covariance of productivity level and employment growth) and to estimate
the association of these relationships with firm characteristics, particularly privatization and
competition and how these may have changed in the post-reform period. It is of particular
interest to examine whether ownership and competition measures are associated with the
degree to which the flows appear to enhance productivity.
We first describe the decomposition methodology and then report results. We use a
decomposition analogous to Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan’s (2001) method 2, according to
which aggregate productivity change, ∆Pt, can be decomposed as follows:
∆Pt = ∑ S i ∑ ∆Peit S ei + ∑ S i ∑ ∆S eit (Pei − Pi ) + ∑ ∆S it (Pi − P )
i

e

i

e

(5)

i

where S is the weight (share) of a firm or industry, t indexes years, i indexes industries, and e
indexes enterprises within industries, so that Pit is average productivity of sector i in year t,
Peit is the productivity of enterprise e in sector i in year t. The bars over the variables refer to

averages of year t-1 and t. The first term is the “within firm” effect, the second term
measures intra-sectoral compositional change, and the third term measures inter-sectoral
compositional change. Relative to a method that includes a cross term between productivity
change and employment share change, this method has the disadvantage that within and
between effects are to some extent confounded. This method is less subject to measurement
error, however, a potentially important consideration when using data from Ukraine.
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Following Olley and Pakes (1996), we also conduct a cross-sectional decomposition
of labor productivity:
Pit = Pi + ∑ (S et − S i )(Pet − Pi ) .

(6)

e

We then take the weighted average by employment of each industry’s decomposition. The
first term is the unweighted average of productivity, and the second term shows whether
activity is disproportionately located in high productivity (if the term is positive) or low
productivity (if the term is negative) firms. When examining the time series pattern, we can
see whether the allocation of activity has become more or less productivity-enhancing over
time. This method has two main advantages: differences in productivity cross-sectionally
are more persistent and less affected by measurement error and transitory shocks, and we are
able to include entering and exiting firms in addition to continuing firms.
The results from carrying out these decompositions where productivity is measured as
average labor productivity (the output-employment ratio) and firms and industries are
weighted by employment shares are shown in Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6
Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth, Method 2

1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
1992-00
1992-00

Within Firm
-0.063
-0.441
-0.227
-0.209
-0.066
-0.095
-0.054
0.057
-0.909
-0.137

IntraSector
0.005
0.010
0.013
0.019
0.015
0.027
0.032
0.041
0.091
0.020

InterSector
0.013
0.037
0.062
0.064
0.039
0.032
0.024
0.043
0.402
0.039

Total Growth
-0.045
-0.395
-0.152
-0.125
-0.012
-0.036
0.002
0.142
-0.417
-0.078

Within-firm productivity change was the dominant component in the early 1990s, reflecting a
common negative productivity shock early in the transition. As in Russia and the U.S., this
component was highly pro-cyclical. Both intersectoral and intrasectoral reallocation had
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positive effects on productivity growth throughout the period, partially counteracting the
negative within-firm productivity decline. Intersectoral reallocation increased soon after
reforms began, while intrasectoral reallocation was slower to appear. By 1997–98, though,
intrasectoral reallocation had become as important as intersectoral reallocation to productivity
growth, and they each had nearly as large an effect on productivity growth as within-firm
change. The main differences with the Russian results are that intrasectoral reallocation
became an important contributor to productivity growth at an earlier point in the transition in
Russia, and Russian intersectoral reallocation became less important in the late 1990s while it
remained important (though declining somewhat too) in Ukraine.
Table 7
Cross-Sectional Decomposition of Labor Productivity

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Weighted
Average
Productivity
6.332
2.820
4.764
6.121
1.819
1.877
1.997
2.308
2.772

Unweighted
Average
Productivity
6.201
2.646
4.585
5.935
1.561
1.557
1.680
1.902
2.358

Cross
0.131
0.175
0.179
0.186
0.258
0.320
0.317
0.405
0.414

Cross/Weighted Average
Productivity
0.021
0.062
0.038
0.030
0.142
0.170
0.159
0.175
0.149

The cross-sectional decomposition in Table 7 shows that employment was fairly
evenly spread among more and less productive firms in the early reform years. In 1996
employment became much more concentrated in more productive firms, and it remained so
through 2000. In the late 1990s employment concentration in higher productivity firms was
significantly greater than in Russia.
We next examine whether the estimated relationships between the employment share
growth and productivity differentials are statistically significant, using the set of OLS and
firm-fixed effects regressions shown in Tables 8 (unweighted) and 9 (weighted by employ-
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Table 8
Reallocation Productivity Regressions

PD
PD*Time
Time
Constant
R2
N

Firm Productivity
Growth (OLS)

Firm Productivity
Growth (Fixed
Effects)

0.024 (22.60)
-0.241 (-56.45)
0.014
35,406

0.017 (15.71)
-0.219 (-51.60)
0.014
35,406

Percentage
Industry
Percentage
Percentage Firm
Employment Share
Industry
Percentage Firm Employment Share
Growth (Fixed
Employment Share
Growth (Fixed
Employment Share
Effects)
Growth (OLS)
Effects)
Growth (OLS)
0.061 (6.49)
0.104 (7.04)
0.020 (5.38)
0.006 (2.57)
0.004 (1.72)
-0.004 (-1.35)
-0.001 (-1.61)
-0.001 (-2.23)
-0.008 (-3.16)
-0.009 (-4.64)
0.001 (1.02)
0.000 (0.15)
0.020 (2.86)
0.025 (3.35)
-0.002 (-1.01)
-0.000 (-0.14)
0.007
0.006
0.085
0.069
35,406
35,406
2,005
2,005

Note: t statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors in the OLS specifications are adjusted for clustering on the firm in the firm regressions and on the industry
in the industry regression. PD is the lagged difference in productivity between the firm and the average for the industry in the third and fourth columns, and the difference in
productivity between the industry and the average for all manufacturing in the fifth and sixth columns. Time is a time trend ranging from 0 in 1993 to 7 in 2000.
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Table 9
Reallocation Productivity Regressions (Employment-Weighted)

PD
PD*Time
Time
Constant
R2
N

Firm Productivity
Growth (OLS)

Firm Productivity
Growth (Fixed
Effects)

0.036 (17.91)
-0.257 (-32.02)
0.038
35,406

0.031 (31.66)
-0.239 (-60.97)
0.056
35,406

Percentage
Percentage
Percentage Firm
Percentage Firm
Industry
Industry
Employment Share Employment Share
Employment Share Employment Share
Growth (Fixed
Growth (OLS)
Growth (Fixed
Growth (OLS)
Effects)
Effects)
0.157 (4.15)
0.260 (8.25)
0.070 (5.22)
-0.001 (-0.25)
0.019 (1.90)
-0.001 (-0.17)
0.005 (0.53)
0.005 (5.93)
-0.029 (-2.28)
-0.030 (-8.60)
0.012 (1.63)
0.005 (6.10)
0.118 (2.96)
0.118 (8.53)
-0.020 (-1.79)
0.006 (1.93)
0.015
0.066
0.340
0.745
35,406
35,406
2,005
2,005

Note: t statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors in the OLS specifications are adjusted for clustering on the firm in the firm regressions and on the industry
in the industry regression. PD is the lagged difference in productivity between the firm and the average for the industry in the third and fourth columns, and the difference in
productivity between the industry and the average for all manufacturing in the fifth and sixth columns. Time is a time trend ranging from 0 in 1993 to 7 in 2000.
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ment). The within effect (average firm productivity growth) is negative initially but increases
at a highly significant rate, becoming positive by the end of the period, as shown in the first
two regressions. In the next two regressions we break the intrasectoral reallocation term into
its two components, making the firm employment share of its industry growth the dependent
variable and the productivity difference between the firm and the average for the industry
(PD), the independent variable. PD is lagged to avoid simultaneity bias with the dependent
variable. We find that the coefficient on the productivity difference is positive and highly
statistically significant, but the trend over time is unclear, as it is positive in the OLS
specification and negative but insignificant when adding fixed effects.
The last two regressions analogously break the intersectoral effect into its two
components: industry employment share growth on the left-hand side, and the lagged
productivity difference between the industry and all manufacturing on the right-hand side. In
the unweighted regressions the productivity difference is positive but declining over time.
The productivity difference is positive and untrended in the weighted OLS regression, while
it is insignificant at the beginning of reform and increasingly positive over time once adding
fixed effects. Thus, each of the components of labor productivity growth is statistically
significant, but the trends on the effect of intra- and intersectoral reallocation on productivity
growth are ambiguous.
A final question concerns covariates of the relationship between intrasectoral
productivity differences and intrasectoral firm employment share. Of particular interest is the
possibility that good corporate governance and effective market competition encourage less
productive

firms to contract relative to more productive ones in an industry:

have

privatization and competition strengthened the productivity-enhancing effect of job
reallocation?
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Our approach to analyzing this issue relies on OLS and fixed effects regressions of the
growth in a firm’s industry employment share on PD, the interactions of PD with the time
trend and with firm characteristics, and three-way interactions of PD, the time trend, and firm
characteristics. As before, firm characteristics are held fixed throughout the period, so that
the estimated coefficients on the three-way interactions measure the increased impact of firm
characteristics later in the transition on the strength of the relationship between PD and
growth in the firm’s industry employment share. With respect to the non-state dummy, for
instance, the coefficient on the interaction with PD measures the early transition relationship
of employment growth and PD for firms that subsequently became non-state (i.e., firms that
were subsequently privatized), while the coefficient on the three-way interaction measures
the change that occurred after reforms were actually adopted (i.e., after firms were actually
privatized).
The results of OLS and fixed-effects estimation of this equation are displayed in
Tables 10 (unweighted) and 11 (weighted by employment). The effect of ownership change
on the intensity of the employment growth-PD relationship varies widely across the
specifications. In the unweighted OLS specification the relationship was stronger in firms to
be privatized, but it weakened once they were privatized. There was no difference in the
employment growth–PD relationship between firms to be privatized and those to remain
state, but it became stronger over time for privatized firms in the weighted fixed-effects
specification.
As for the effect of market competition, product market concentration actually
intensified the relationship in the early reform years, but that changed as time went on,
consistent with domestic competition beginning to discipline less productive firms to
restructure. Exporting, which exposes firms to competition in foreign markets, was associated
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Table 10
Between-Firm Reallocation Productivity Regressions

PD
PD*Nonstate
PD*Conc.
PD*Export
PD*LaborConc.
PD*Capital
PD*Wage
PD*Emp.
PD*Time
PD*Nonstate*Time
PD*Conc.*Time
PD*Export*Time
PD*LaborConc.*Time
PD*Capital*Time
PD*Wage*Time
PD*Emp.*Time
Nonstate
Conc.
Export
LaborConc.
Capital
Wage
Emp.
Nonstate*Time
Conc.*Time
Export*Time
LaborConc.*Time
Capital*Time
Wage*Time
Emp.*Time
Time
Constant
R2
N

Percentage Firm
Employment Share Growth
(OLS)
-0.274 (-3.38)
0.065
(2.44)
0.181
(3.69)
0.083
(3.30)
-0.029 (-0.46)
0.097
(2.97)
-0.027 (-0.81)
0.028
(2.23)
-0.025 (-1.20)
-0.013 (-2.01)
-0.018 (-1.60)
-0.007 (-1.14)
0.024
(1.38)
-0.008 (-0.91)
0.035
(3.95)
0.006
(1.88)
-0.017 (-0.88)
0.101
(2.43)
-0.035 (-1.98)
0.052
(1.12)
-0.112 (-4.50)
0.095
(2.97)
0.045
(4.23)
-0.008 (-1.37)
-0.039 (-2.54)
0.011
(2.23)
0.026
(1.51)
0.007
(0.79)
-0.004 (-0.36)
-0.012 (-3.36)
0.057
(2.40)
-0.228 (-3.41)
0.019
35,406

Percentage Firm
Employment Share Growth
(Fixed Effects)
-0.314 (-3.08)
0.024
(0.63)
0.195
(2.91)
0.082
(2.18)
-0.114 (-1.01)
0.083
(1.44)
-0.033 (-0.55)
0.057
(3.55)
-0.005 (-0.25)
-0.008 (-1.10)
-0.028 (-2.19)
-0.002 (-0.31)
0.024
(1.13)
-0.013 (-1.21)
0.039
(3.51)
0.000
(0.13)

-0.010
(-1.89)
-0.045
(-4.87)
0.012
(2.49)
0.025
(1.73)
0.004
(0.48)
0.001
(0.07)
-0.012
(-6.08)
0.061
(4.68)
0.019
(2.21)
0.015
35,406

Note: t statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for firm clustering in the OLS specification.
is the lagged difference in productivity between the firm and the average for the industry. Time is a time tr
ranging from 0 in 1993 to 7 in 2000.
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Table 11
Between-Firm Reallocation Productivity Regressions (Employment-Weighted)

PD
PD*Nonstate
PD*Conc.
PD*Export
PD*LaborConc.
PD*Capital
PD*Wage
PD*Emp.
PD*Time
PD*Nonstate*Time
PD*Conc.*Time
PD*Export*Time
PD*LaborConc.*Time
PD*Capital*Time
PD*Wage*Time
PD*Emp.*Time
Nonstate
Conc.
Export
LaborConc.
Capital
Wage
Emp.
Nonstate*Time
Conc.*Time
Export*Time
LaborConc.*Time
Capital*Time
Wage*Time
Emp.*Time
Time
Constant
R2
N

Percentage Firm
Employment Share Growth
(OLS)
-0.578 (-1.82)
0.054
(0.58)
0.513
(2.60)
0.187
(2.59)
0.424
(1.31)
0.218
(1.83)
0.052
(0.39)
0.021
(0.46)
-0.154 (-1.72)
0.001
(0.03)
-0.059 (-1.46)
-0.042 (-2.38)
0.019
(0.19)
-0.001 (-0.05)
0.054
(1.58)
0.029
(2.31)
-0.032 (-0.40)
0.594
(2.34)
-0.155 (-2.43)
-0.043 (-0.13)
-0.330 (-2.75)
0.321
(1.87)
0.093
(2.31)
-0.024 (-0.83)
-0.193 (-2.64)
0.038
(2.18)
-0.002 (-0.01)
0.040
(1.02)
-0.045 (-0.89)
-0.014 (-1.54)
0.120
(1.27)
-0.594 (-1.86)
0.041
35,406

Percentage Firm
Employment Share Growth
(Fixed Effects)
-0.776 (-3.75)
-0.106 (-1.31)
0.546
(3.51)
0.119
(1.41)
0.608
(2.46)
0.048
(0.36)
0.060
(0.45)
0.101
(3.41)
-0.101 (-2.69)
0.029
(1.95)
-0.078 (-2.75)
-0.018 (-1.18)
-0.011 (-0.22)
0.006
(0.24)
0.060
(2.53)
0.013
(2.50)

-0.025
(-2.61)
-0.203 (-12.26)
0.041
(4.00)
0.015
(0.56)
0.038
(2.38)
-0.046
(-2.82)
-0.013
(-4.23)
0.113
(5.33)
0.112
(7.33)
0.080
35,406

Note: t statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for firm clustering in the OLS specification.
is the lagged difference in productivity between the firm and the average for the industry, twice lagged. Time
time trend ranging from 0 in 1993 to 7 in 2000.
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with productivity-enhancing reallocation, though this declined over time in the weighted
fixed-effects regressions. Surprisingly, the results of the weighted regressions suggest that
reallocation was more productivity enhancing in concentrated labor markets.
Finally, the regressions also include capital intensity, wage, and employment size,
variables which are frequently argued to represent greater firm-specific human capital. How
labor adjustment costs affect the employment share growth—productivity differential
relationship will depend on the shape of the adjustment cost function, but one possibility is
that those costs are lumpy, so that employment is adjusted only when some threshold of the
deviation of optimal from actual employment is reached.7 In this case, employment changes
may be more closely associated with the firm’s productivity differential than they would be
for firms with low adjustment costs, as the changes in the former case are no longer marginal
decisions.
The data appear to support this interpretation. All three of these proxy variables—
capital intensity, average wage, and employment size—are estimated to increase the partial
correlation of employment share growth with the firm’s relative productivity. Only with
respect to the average wage, however, is there strong evidence that this relationship has
strengthened during the sample period.

4. Conclusion
As in other transition economies, job reallocation in Ukraine has increased
considerably after a program of liberalization was begun. By contrast with some other
countries—Russia for instance—the Ukrainian increase appears to be slower, however, and
the rise in the contribution of intrasectoral reallocation productivity appears to be smaller.
The effects of privatization and product market competition are also somewhat different

7

Hamermesh (1993) presents evidence that plant-level employment adjustments tend to be highly
concentrated, consistent with lumpy costs of adjustments.
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compared to Russia:

both are associated with greater excess reallocation in Ukraine

(although neither is in Russia), while privatization has an unclear effect and competition a
positive effect on the productivity-reallocation relationship (both have positive effects in
Russia).
Ukraine’s transition policies have frequently been labeled “gradualist,” compared to
Russia’s “shock therapy,” yet it is difficult to find much difference between the official
macroeconomic performance records of the two countries. The microeconomic evidence
presented here, however, is consistent with the view that reforms have stimulated
restructuring and reallocation in both countries, and that the employment reallocation has
become productivity-enhancing. These effects appear to have taken place more quickly and
strongly in Russia than in Ukraine, implying that the pace of policy reforms may be reflected
in microeconomic behavior.

Data Appendix
The firm panel data in this study are constructed from Derzhkomstat (State
Committee for Statistics) industrial registries. In 1992 and 2000 the registry covered
approximately 94.1 and 85.2 percent of total industrial employment, respectively. We restrict
the analysis to continuing firms in manufacturing industries, with the exceptions of Table 4,
where non-manufacturing industrial sectors (e.g., electricity, extraction, and industrial
services) are included, and Table 7, where entering and exiting firms are taken into account.
To eliminate implausible outliers, we excluded observations with large employment
changes scaled by size as follows: firms with below 50 employees in one year that grow to
over 250 in the next, firms with between 50 and 199 employees that grow (calculated
according to the Davis-Haltiwanger method8) over 120 percent or under -170 percent, firm
with employment between 200 and 499 growing more than 100 percent or under -150
percent, and firms with employment of 500 or more growing more than 80 percent or under 130 percent. The labor productivity decompositions also exclude observations for firms in
pairs of years where the absolute value of annual labor productivity growth, calculated using
the Davis-Haltiwanger method, exceeds 1.
Variable Definitions
Capital is the rank order of firms by capital intensity, calculated by dividing average book
value of fixed assets used in the main activity of the enterprise by employment for each year
8

Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and most subsequent research on job flows measure employment growth
as 2(empt − empt −1 ) .
empt −1 + empt

26

in which both values exist in the database. Firms are ranked by capital intensity in each year,
an average of the yearly ranks is calculated for each firm, and finally the firms are ranked
according to these yearly averages with the ranks expressed in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 is
the most capital-intensive.
Conc. is product market concentration in 1992, calculated as the regional HerfindahlHirschman Index multiplied by region share plus the national Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
multiplied by one minus region share, where region share is the proportion of regions
(oblasts) with at least one enterprise in the five-digit industry in 1992.
Employment is the average number of personnel in industrial production divisions
(including both production and non-production employees) in the year. When used as a
measure of size, employment is the natural log of the average of the firm’s employment in all
non-missing years.
Export is a dummy variable equal to one if the enterprise exported in 1998, 1999, or 2000
(the years for which the registries have firm-level export information).
LaborConc. is a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industrial employment concentration in the
county (raion) in 1993, calculated using the industrial registry.
Labor Productivity is the natural log of output minus the natural log of employment.
Output is the value of output produced, net of VAT and excise taxes. For 1992–96, the data
set contains real output for the current and previous year. We use this when examining labor
productivity growth over pairs of years during that time. For 1996–2000, we deflated
nominal output using the annual industry producer price index relative to 1990, as reported
by Ukrainian Economic Trends. When analyzing productivity growth over periods longer
than one year, we deflated all nominal values by the industry producer price index.
Wage is a ranking of average wage rates, calculated by dividing the total wage bill by the
average industrial employment for each year in which both values exist in the database.
Firms are ranked by average wage in each year, an average of the yearly ranks is calculated
for each firm, and finally the firms are ranked according to these yearly averages with the
ranks expressed in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 has the highest average wage.
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